Zelenskyy Calls Putin’s Bluff on Peace Negotiations

A Diplomatic Victory That Could Force Trump to Back Away from Putin

On May 11, Vladimir Putin rejected a proposed 30-day ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine and instead offered to speak directly with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in Istanbul, Turkey. On the eve of the summit, after Zelenskyy publicly accepted Moscow's offer, Putin quietly cancelled his visit to Istanbul and will send one of his least respected aides instead. Ukraine called Russia’s bluff and scored a significant diplomatic win.

Over the past few months, Ukrainian, European, American, and even Russian policymakers have increasingly discussed a ceasefire agreement or peace treaty between Kyiv and Moscow. Ukraine and its Western allies have displayed an earnest desire for a lasting peace in the region, while Russia has used the prospect of opening a negotiation process as a means to buy time to reconstitute its forces while stringing along Trump and his diplomats.

From a Ukrainian perspective, the past three years of fighting have taken a heavy toll and will require a generation of reconstruction efforts - however, knowing the recent history of Russia and Eastern Europe, there is still no appetite for accepting Russia’s maximalist demands. These demands would include handing over territory that Russia doesn’t even currently occupy, accepting Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory in perpetuity, demilitarizing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and formally ending any integration process that would lead to Ukrainian entry into NATO or alignment with the West. Essentially, these demands amount to surrendering Ukrainian sovereignty.

To make matters worse, current conditions include a major nonstarter as Russia will only entertain prospective peace agreements so long as they do not come with any security guarantees. This means that Russia could essentially use a break in active conflict as a means to rebuild its forces and attack Ukraine in the near future. Considering that Russia has spent the last 35 years repeatedly violating its agreements, there’s little reason for Ukraine to assume Russia would abide by the agreement purely out of good faith - especially with the absence of American security guarantees.

As we approach the start of a supposed peace process, we should consider the reality that Ukraine appears to have more staying power than Russia in this war. Russia’s rate of advance is minimal, and while Ukraine is still losing small tracts of land, there has yet to be a major setback along the line of contact in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine’s military is adapting and reorganizing and its military-industrial complex continues to deliver innovative tools and expand its strategic capabilities, while Russia’s military hasn’t developed tactics that reduce its massive casualty rates, while growing increasingly dependent on a shrinking inventory of dated Soviet-era equipment.

From a European perspective, the reelection of Donald Trump and the policies of his administration have severely damaged the transatlantic alliance. Europe will have to spend the next three years expanding its defense-industrial base to attempt to close the gap of U.S. withdrawl from the continent. This means increasing military production to offset the absence of U.S. support and a multi-year effort to purchase of American defense articles to fulfill European and Ukrainian needs. European states may be able to deter Russian aggression with troops in Ukraine after a ceasefire, but that deterrent is less meaningful absent American security guarantees would. Thus, it is ultimately still in Brussels’ interest to keep the U.S. engaged on matters related to European security and support Ukraine as long as possible. Consequently, Europe will continue to use the Russia-Ukraine negotiation as a means of drawing in continued American engagement with European security while uniting a coalition of the willing around the common objective deterring Russia.

The Trump administration’s stated goal is peace at all costs - the implicit goal is “damn Ukraine.” Trump’s supposed pacifism is a thin cover for his desire to do business with Russia and friending Putin. Fortunately, Ukraine is a state with agency and won’t capitulate. Ukraine has effectively managed the U.S.-Ukraine relationship and prevented a clear break in support following a rocky few weeks in January and February. There’s only been an 11-day suspension of intelligence and security assistance. It appears that Trump doesn’t have the stomach for hard decisions and wants an easy win. Heading into this process, Trump just wants to claim a victory and move on. This failure to achieve peace with Putin as the primary impediment may revert U.S.-Ukraine policy to a status quo, with the United States continuing intelligence sharing, closing-out the security assistance already approved by Congress, and going forward, selling additional arms to Ukraine.

From a Russian perspective, the goal remains to subdue Ukraine, weaken and ultimately destroy European unity, and continue to challenge U.S. primacy. Trump has delivered on his half of these goals. Consequently, a pragmatic compromise from Putin to end the war remains a distant prospect. Putin will continue to attempt to co-opt the Trump administration’s interest in peace and demonstrated interest in normalizing relations with authoritarians for as long as he can and be prepared to settle back to traditional east-west, Russia-U.S. confrontation format.

What does that mean for the current round of negotiations? Direct negotiations without preconditions between Putin and Zelenskyy would be a major departure from the past three years of shuttle-diplomacy and negotiations via back-channels. Putin’s offer to negotiate face-to-face was a bluff. Zelenskyy’s acceptance to meet will caste Russia as the impediment to Trump’s quick peace.

The goal of Russian diplomacy remains what it was since the start of the conflict: subdue Ukraine. Barring that, the goals are to secure territorial gains and concessions from Kyiv through a settlement that’s favorable to Moscow, pause the conflict long enough to rebuild forces, and then attempt to subdue Ukraine again.

Part of this process includes repeatedly framing Ukraine as being a stubborn opponent of peace or arguing that Kyiv is being goaded into the war by outside powers (typically the United States or United Kingdom). Despite launching the invasion to fulfill an imperial mandate to subjugate and conquer Ukraine, Moscow has attempted to present itself as a benevolent party willing to settle for peace - so long as Ukraine accepts Russia’s “security-related demands.”

Zelenskyy was right to accept the offer of direct negotiations in Istanbul. Putin may have made the offer with the assumption that Ukraine would have immediately rejected it, which would ultimately strengthen Russia’s framing of Ukraine and Zelenskyy’s government as being a stubborn obstacle to peace. Now, Putin may look uncooperative to Trump.

Already, there are certain indicators emerging that suggest that the White House may be slowly shifting is heavily Russia-centric strategy. If I could speculate (and satirize) on the conversations happening within the national security apparatus of the United States, they may sound a little something like this:

“Mr. President, you are a smart and beautiful man and the peacemaker of our age. You will surely get your well-deserved Nobel Peace Prize by striking a deal with Putin to end the war. As you say, Ukraine is bad, and Russia is good and we can make great deals in Russia. … But Putin is crafty and may be playing you. Remember, he’s a KGB guy. You want to be the winner. If Putin doesn’t want peace, then you should go back to your other great and wonderful idea of sanctioning Russia and supporting Ukraine. Because remember you struck that awesome deal with Ukraine to get them to give you $350B and rare earths. Let’s see how it goes. Either way you are a winner.”

So now, we are approaching the next chapter of this process. In my latest book The Folly of Realism, I wrote that Putin leverages his opponents’ hopes and fears to play them. Trump wants to be the winner. Trump is having to discover that Putin is making him look like a loser. Trump will be burned by his folly. It may be some months before this lesson is clear. When this lesson is learned, we may see the Trump administration pivot to a more rational policy for the Ukraine war.