From Syria to Sudan

How Ukraine Battles Russian Forces Abroad

As mentioned in my previous Substack, the collapse of the Assad regime should be viewed as a sign of Russia’s diminishing power projection capabilities. Having lost support from the wider public in the wake of the Arab Spring, the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad was heavily dependent on direct military intervention from its allies as a means of securing legitimacy. With Russia’s preoccupation with the ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the decimation of Iranian proxies in the Levant, Assad’s regime crumbled when faced with a renewed push by a broad coalition of rebels.

Looking beyond the power vacuum left by Tehran and Moscow, observers should consider the importance of an often overlooked yet significant factor in the collapse of the Assad regime: the Ukrainian advisors, technicians, and special forces operators that have fought Russian troops and proxies for nearly three years. Since the 2022 invasion, Ukrainian intelligence has waged a quiet war against Moscow’s deployments in Syria and Sudan. Ukrainian operatives abroad have managed to inflict losses within elite units like the Wagner Group and have shared best practices and insights on conducting drone operations with allied parties. Having long been considered a security guarantor for autocrats across the globe, Russia is now facing a capable challenge from a peer opponent abroad.

Boots on the Ground

Ukrainian marksman firing on targets in Sudan

The most direct form of Ukrainian intervention against Russian proxies abroad has been the deployment of HUR operatives in Sudan. Wagner Group has been active in Sudan since 2017 and had initially served as auxiliary support for president Omar al-Bashir. The mercenary group continued to operate in the country after al-Bashir’s overthrow in 2019 and expanded its original security role to include the overseeing of gold mining and other commercial activities. Wager Group has been accused of supporting the Sundanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary organization that has waged an insurgency against the Sudanese military since 2023.

Footage circulating on Telegram in late 2023 reportedly depicted a Ukrainian marksman firing on a target in Sudan. Investigative reporting from Belingcat confirmed that the footage was indeed recorded in Sudan. Additional footage circulated on Telegram depicted quadcopter kamikazee drones striking Wagner-affiliated militias in Sudan. This was followed by drone-captured footage showing close quarters fighting between HUR operatives and Wagner Group members in an unnamed Sudanese city. In early 2024, the Kyiv Post shared a video of a Ukrainian special forces operator “Timur” (previously involved in a mission to plant a Ukrainian flag on occupied Crimea) interrogating a captured Wagner Group member in Sudan.

Footage of Ukrainian operatives engaging Wagner Group in Sudan. Image from Kyiv Post

It’s safe to assume that the Wagner Group did not expect an opposing force with similar capabilities and training when deploying to Sudan: Wagner Group missions typically include attacking untrained militias, guarding mines and areas of commercial interest, and providing security to whichever unpopular ruler rented their services. However, the greatest threat that the HUR poses to Wagner operations abroad is not on a tactical and kinetic level but instead in the areas of reputation and credibility. Wagner Group is considered to be a cornerstone of Russian foreign interventions and has been crucial to maintaining stability in several unpopular regimes - the fact that Ukrainian operatives have managed to engage and defeat Wagner forces abroad has damaged the image of the mercenary group as being a force without peers. While Zelensky has been open with his support of the Sudanese government and opposition to Russia’s activities in Africa, the mission profile of Kyiv’s intervention plays into the wider asymmetry between Russia and Ukraine: there’s no need for Kyiv to prop up a failing or unpopular regime, Ukraine only needs to focus on fighting Russian proxies and supporting a popular front.

Best Practices and Drones

According to a recent article published in the Washington Post, the Syrian rebel coalition HTS received support from Ukrainian operatives during its recent offensive against the Assad regime. 20 Ukrainian drone operators and at least 150 FPV UAVs were deployed to the rebel-controlled city of Idlib five weeks before the offensive. These forces trained Syrian rebels on drone operations and were later directly involved in combat operations against Assad’s government.

FPV Drone operated by Syrian rebels moments before striking tank

While small in scale compared to the Russian deployment to Syria, we should consider how the different objectives of Kyiv and Moscow factor into the asymmetry of Ukrainian deployments abroad. Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 had two goals. The first objective was to secure a long-term presence in the Mediterranean and Levant through the defense of the Assad regime. The second was to reassert Russia’s role as a global actor and display Moscow’s renewed naval and aerial capabilities. In comparison, Kyiv’s objective was to inflict losses on the already diminished Russian forces in Syria - a task which could be accomplished by a relatively small number of personnel and FPV drones. In doing so, Ukraine has further eroded Russia’s reputation as a security partner and has laid the groundwork for warm relations with the incoming Syrian government.

A Democratic Alliance Against the Authoritarian Axis?

Ukraine’s interventions in Sudan and Syria are examples of Kyiv’s growing force projection capabilities. Just as the authoritarian axis of China, Iran, and Russia have mobilized material and political support of Moscow’s invasion, we should consider the viability of Ukraine as a cornerstone of an emerging Democratic Alliance against authoritarian interests abroad. The Ukrainian military has nearly three years’ worth of best practices in fighting the Russian military and many of these techniques appear applicable to conflicts across the globe. Additionally, it should be noted that rather than propping up failing regimes and dictators that lack legitimacy and popular support, Ukraine’s interventions have been broadly in support of popular fronts and without concerns over potential “escalation” with Russia. While it may be tempting to view Kyiv’s interventions solely through the lens of realpolitik, there is a genuine shared political struggle against the Russian war machine that simultaneously bombs cities in Ukraine and protects despots abroad.

If Ukraine’s force projection capabilities continue to grow, Kyiv may emerge as a lasting counterweight to Russian influence across the world. This can come in the form of direct, albeit limited military intervention, as well as through the sharing of best practices and drone training. Additionally, it is possible that Ukraine’s domestically produced drones and cruise missiles become a viable alternative to Russian platforms for the militaries of emerging economies across the world (and carry none of the political baggage that comes with the Russian defense technology). If nothing else, we should look at Ukraine’s campaign of asymmetrical intervention abroad as an example of the downward trajectory of Russian power projection.