What Congress and the American People Should Be Asking About Venezuela

In Collaboration with Michael L. Burgoyne and Albert “Jim” Marckwardt

Satellite imagery captured by the European Space Agency of the USS Iwo Jima maneuvering in the eastern Caribbean Sea. Source article linked here.

It is difficult to judge the current U.S. strategy in the Western Hemisphere and its overall effectiveness as there are more questions than answers. As of this writing, the United States has amassed a substantial military presence in the Caribbean including an Amphibious Ready Group, a Carrier Strike Group, F35s, M-Q9 “Reaper” UAVs, and special operations forces. The military has conducted more than ten lethal strikes against alleged drug boats in international waters resulting in the deaths of more than 50 people. All of these actions have been conducted without an authorization of force from Congress and barring such an authorization, their continuation after November 3rd will be in violation of the 60 day limit imposed by the War Powers Resolution. If the Trump administration plans on continuing lethal strikes against drug traffickers or expanding operations to achieve regime change in Venezuela, it is imperative that Congress and the American people understand the administration’s objectives and the strategy. A failure to challenge unbalanced strategies led to the “forever wars” of the War on Terror. Congress and the American people currently have a window of opportunity to demand answers before operations escalate further in the Americas.

Strategy is about understanding the world as it is and formulating a set of actions to create a new steady state that is preferable. Traditionally, effective strategy should balance ends, ways, and means – What is to be accomplished? How will it be done? And, with what resources? Other scholars point to the need for a “theory of success.” Critically, a good strategy must incorporate an understanding of the operating environment and adversary (or adversaries). An examination of the current military campaign in the hemisphere using these principles reveals a number of important questions that should be answered if the country wants to reduce the risks inherent with the current use of military force.

The Drug War

The desired end-state or objective being pursued in the Caribbean remains unclear. As such the first and most important question to be asked is, What is the U.S. strategic objective in Venezuela?

The President and members of the administration have stated that the United States is conducting strikes on drug boats emanating from Venezuela and Colombia and that striking these boats saves American lives by reducing drug overdoses. In January 2025 the White House officially designated drug cartels and other transnational criminal organizations in the Western Hemisphere as foreign terrorist organizations. Part of this declaration included the claim that these groups have “flooded the United States with deadly drugs, violent criminals, and vicious gangs.” On the surface, this appears to be a straightforward approach. Drug overdoses in the United States are an unwanted phenomenon. The use of lethal military force against drug traffickers will physically destroy drugs and traffickers while deterring additional production and shipments. These attacks would be conducted by a military task force which includes a Marine Expeditionary Force and a Carrier Strike Group.

At the core of this strategy is an assumption that these military actions can reduce the availability of narcotics like cocaine in the United States and that this reduction will decrease use and thus decrease overdoses. However, this assumption is problematic because despite significant investments in interdiction, the availability of drugs in the United States has not been reduced to the extent that prices have been significantly impacted. Furthermore, 76% of overdose deaths in the United States are the result of synthetic opioids which are primarily produced in Mexico. Finally, the estimated $400 - $600 billion drug trafficking industry has proven extremely resilient and innovative. Shipments through the Caribbean account for less than 20% of cocaine shipped to the US. Lethal strikes on the drug boats at sea would likely push trafficking towards land routes. This would increase corruption and instability in Central American countries, ultimately making it harder to interdict drugs.

Finally, it is unclear which metrics will be used by the administration to track the effectiveness of potential military strikes on Venezuela in reducing drug overdose deaths.

Regime Change

While addressing drug overdoses has been cited as the objective of current operations, there are also indications that the real objective is regime change in Venezuela. The removal of Nicolas Maduro and his cohort of criminal thugs would be a welcome change for the people of Venezuela and the hemisphere. However, there appear to be some missing or incoherent elements of a regime change strategy.

The “theory of success” here is unclear. Assuming regime change and the return of democratic rule are the desired end-state, an examination of ways and means is of value here. There are five general outcomes available to Maduro and his allies: death, escape to exile, incarceration, insurgency, or maintaining power. For U.S. strategy to be successful Maduro must be eliminated or convinced to step down, and crucially, the opposition must be able to assume power without a devolution into insurgency or general instability. This would require a deft synchronization of elements of national power.

In 2019, when the Trump administration applied a maximum pressure campaign against Maduro there was a robust economic and diplomatic effort employed. Military pressure was limited at the time due to commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrast, today, the military element is being fully exercised, while the contribution of other elements has been less impactful.

In 2019, the Lima Group and an aggressive diplomatic effort provided valuable credibility to the pressure campaign. Critically, Venezuela’s neighbors Brazil and Colombia were generally supportive of the effort. Today, Brazil and Colombia are at odds with the administration. Brazil has been hit with punishing tariffs due to the conviction of former President Bolsonaro. Colombia’s mercurial president has been sanctioned by the U.S. government after a series of public disagreements with President Trump. While a coalition was not fully constructed in 2019, it was not impossible to imagine a regional effort to stabilize Venezuela in the case of Maduro’s departure. As such, one must inquire:

Have we leveraged diplomacy within the Organization of American States or among a coalition of the willing to support our efforts? Is there any support from the Organization of American States or Rio Treaty members for a post regime peacekeeping force?

Thus far, the Organization of American States has not issued any statements with regards to the ongoing counter-narcotics smuggling operation in Venezuela. Earlier this summer, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau claimed that the United States may leave the OAS unless the organization could “prove its relevance”. This suggests that engagement with multilateral regional bodies is not part of the U.S. approach to the ongoing operation near Venezuela. The United States has yet to form a “coalition of the willing” in the Americas for either a military campaign in Venezuela or a post-war peacekeeping operation.

Brazil’s reactions to U.S. attacks on Venezuela are particularly relevant as it is the largest and wealthiest South American country. Brazil has already been a destination for migrant flows from Venezuela. A strike campaign or invasion could increase the flow of civilians towards the Brazilian border. At the time of writing, there is no indication that the Brazilian government would support or assist the United States in a military operation in Venezuela. It’s possible that in the event of an armed conflict, Brazil could offer Maduro an off-ramp through asylum which would be a helpful measure toward returning democratic rule to Venezuela. However, Brazil has been engaged in a patient strategy to achieve “consensual hegemony” in South America. Brazil actively opposed U.S. basing in Colombia during Plan Colombia and would see any U.S. military presence in Venezuela as a threat to its place on the continent.

Colombia’s reaction is just as important. Colombia, a Major Non-NATO US Ally and NATO Global Partner, has historically been a key U.S. partner in the region. However, recent tensions between Petro and Trump, have put the relationship into question. The U.S. recently decertified Colombia for not upholding its counternarcotics commitments leading to the suspension of all U.S. foreign assistance. After several Colombian citizens were reportedly killed during an American strike on a naval vessel in early October, President Petro claimed that “There is no war on smuggling. There is a war for oil and it must be stopped by the world”. Given this increased bilateral tension, it is highly unlikely that Colombia would provide any support to the United States in the event of a strike campaign or invasion. As the largest recipient of Venezuelan migrants - with over 2.8 million to date - any major military operation by the U.S. will likely result in additional migrants flowing into Colombia, further straining the country’s limited resources. Ultimately, a U.S. military intervention in Venezuela could have long lasting devastating effects on the most reliable partnership Washington has in the region, and by extension, on U.S. influence across the hemisphere.

Another critical element in any regime change strategy will be information and intelligence. If one route to victory is convincing Maduro and other senior leaders to flee the country, then the strategy must be informed by excellent intelligence and an understanding of Maduro’s incentives and fears. As such a question for the intelligence community must be:

What combination of threats and promises could convince Maduro and senior leaders to step down or depart Venezuela?

The outcome of the invasion of Iraq provides a cautionary lesson. In that case, an overreliance on assessments from members of the Iraqi diaspora resulted in overoptimistic assumptions about post-invasion Iraq. No doubt, the Venezuelan diaspora and opposition are also likely painting a rosy picture of an easy victory and the bloodless restoration of democratic rule. However, groups like the colectivos, ELN and a number of other criminal bands that have grown in the past decade have an interest in maintaining some semblance of a criminal state. And these groups are heavily armed. Questions should challenge U.S. assumptions:

How have we ensured that what we know about opposition capability is correct?

Are we prepared for contingencies if optimistic predictions and assumptions prove to be false?

What do the FARC dissident groups and ELN do if there is a power vacuum in Venezuela or a U.S. occupation?

Moreover, Russia and China’s eagerness to exploit the shift in focus to Venezuela will complicate U.S. efforts in the critical European and Pacific Theaters. The shift in focus to Venezuela by the United States military will lead to an immediate draw on munitions and a refocusing of intelligence operations from the Middle East and Eastern Europe to the Caribbean. We can expect that the Russian military will respond to this development by increasing the frequency and scale of UAV attacks on Ukrainian cities in order to deplete an already-shrinking supply of western anti-air systems. Additionally, the Russian military would likely exploit this scenario by increasing the frequency of its violations of NATO airspace in Eastern Europe and mobilizing hybrid warfare actors throughout the European Union. The shift in strategic focus towards Latin America and the Caribbean could also accelerate other power’s timelines for military actions in their own neighborhoods. Furthermore, Vladimir Putin may seize this opportunity to execute his own proxy war in the Americas as payback for U.S. support to Ukraine.

The administration is leaning heavily on the military instrument in maximum pressure 2.0. It remains unclear if this will include a precision strike campaign, or whether this could could escalate to a limited or even full-scale invasion of Venezuela. Given the lack of clarity highlighted by the previous questions, a detailed understanding of the feasibility or suitability of a military operation is not possible. However, a few simple questions must be considered:

How much will military operations cost?

Have adequate resources been provided to ensure success?

Why should Americans risk the lives of their loved ones to restore democracy to Venezuela?

Conclusion

This has not been an exhaustive list of questions. The reason that there are so many questions is because the Trump administration is conducting a deliberate military operation without seeking the authorization of Congress and without convincing the American people that their objectives are worth the expenditure of blood and treasure. Obtaining Congressional approval and engaging in an open debate about policies involving military force are not formalities or distractions. In a democracy, they are a forcing function to ensure that the executive branch has thought through its strategy and has a strong possibility of achieving success at a tolerable cost.

While Latin America appears to be a region that is far-removed from the renewed “Great Power Competition” seen elsewhere in the world, American policy makers must understand the grave consequences that will come from a lack of strategic planning and an overestimation of American capabilities. The launch of a military campaign against Venezuela, without establishing clear objectives and setting proper diplomatic conditions, risks damaging the hemispheric security system that has maintained a relatively peaceful region for more than six decades. Poorly formulated strategy could turn a region of long-term allies into yet another major challenge in a dangerous multipolar world.

Michael L. Burgoyne

Michael L. Burgoyne is a retired U.S. Army Colonel. He deployed twice to Iraq in command and staff positions and served as the Defense Attaché in Kabul, Afghanistan. He was a counterinsurgency trainer at the National Training Center and co-authored The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa, a tactical primer on counterinsurgency. He served in various policy and security cooperation positions in the Americas including assignments as the Army Attaché in Mexico, Andean Ridge Desk Officer at U.S. Army South, Senior Defense Official in Guatemala, and policy analyst at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. Colonel (ret) Burgoyne holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College and an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University. His research and writing focus on security in the Western Hemisphere, insurgency, transnational organized crime, alliances, and defense policy. He is currently pursuing a PhD in War Studies at King’s College London.

Albert “Jim” Marckwardt

Dr. Albert J. Marckwardt, is the Faculty Co-Lead for The Americas at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel and Foreign Area Officer that served in various policy and security cooperation positions including at the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy as the Colombia and Venezuela Country Director, at the U.S. Embassy in Honduras as a Liaison Officer and Political Military Advisor for Joint Task Force Bravo, at the Defense Intelligence Agency as a Defense Strategic Intelligence Planner, and as a Mexico Senior Engagement Officer at U.S. Army North. He deployed twice in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in command and staff positions and coauthored The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa, the premier tactical primer on counterinsurgency. He earned his Doctor of International Affairs and Master of International Public Policy degrees at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.