Ukraine’s Sovereignty Prospects Dim in 2024

A candid assessment of the war, Part 1

Photo by Elena Mozhvilo on Unsplash

The recent stream of negative news around the Ukraine-Russia conflict has started a flood of dire predictions. The general prognosis for Ukraine, Europe, and the West has turned rather negative, and yet it still does not capture the full scope of coming challenges. Let me explain why. First let me say that my baseline assessment is contingent upon the U.S. providing Ukraine security assistance and financial support through 2024. Absent U.S. support, the outlook for Ukraine turns from critical to catastrophic, as no single country or combination of countries can match America’s security assistance or fill the subsequent financial vacuum.

Out of all the troubling data points that I have seen coming from the conflict in recent months, one has stood out to me as particularly disquieting.  It isn’t the lack of major progress in liberating Russian-occupied territory in the south and east, nor the loss of equipment. It’s not the fact that Russia once again outguns Ukraine with swarms of drones and artillery barrages, or even the tragic personnel losses. The most worrisome data point I have seen is that the median age for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is 43 years old. By comparison, the upper age restriction to enlist in the U.S. Army is 35 and the average age is younger than 30. Wars are fought by the young, and the fact that Ukraine’s median soldiers are middle-aged men means that it is running out of manpower. By comparison, the Russian median age is estimated at 35, and since Russia is four times the size of Ukraine this gap will continue to grow, critically tilting combat effectiveness towards Russia. If this trend continues, Ukraine will not have an effective fighting force for much longer, and no amount of Western equipment can overcome this critical factor.

This lack of manpower is in part due to young military-aged men evading conscription. As the euphoria over early success has ebbed and reporting of the severe shortcomings in the conduct of the war continues to emerge, more potential conscripts are eluding military service. And while Ukraine is fighting for its survival, the efforts to close loopholes and stem draft evasion remain incomplete. President Zelenskyy fired each of Ukraine’s regional recruiting commanders, indicating the worrying extent of corruption in military conscription.

The war is in its second year, and there is a standstill along most of the frontlines despite major fighting and high casualty rates. In the military ranks, there is a growing disgust for post-Soviet management styles within the senior leadership, making the task of replacing Ukraine’s combat losses even more challenging in 2024. Ukrainians are increasingly skeptical about supporting a war that is managed by too many senior leaders who operate with a corrosive post-Soviet culture. Consequently, Ukraine must get serious about conscription and prepare for the fallout of the youth in urban areas as they begin to protest an increasingly unpopular war. No amount of money or equipment will save Ukraine unless it meaningfully addresses these manpower issues and replaces its poor Soviet-style military leaders.

Another indicator of ineffective war management and corruption is Ukraine’s failure to mobilize its large industrial base for war. During the Soviet period, Ukraine accounted for a full 25% of the USSR’s military-industrial output. Much of the infrastructure has atrophied over 30 years, but significant portions could have and should have been revitalized. Ukraine is fighting an existential conflict, and what should be managed as a total war has only seen the partial mobilization of its industrial capacity. Ukraine has still not retooled to produce its own munitions nor the Soviet equipment it has the know-how to manufacture, and it has also failed to establish a maintenance and logistics capability to adequately support the war effort. The bottom line is the entire industrial base needs to turn to producing goods for the war effort and the citizenry should be prepared for service in, and operate in support of, the military. Even then Ukraine will need to contend with an enemy whose economy is ten times that of its own. The Russians have already made the transition to something approaching a full-scale war economy. About 39% of the Russian state budget and 10 percent of its GDP is being spent on military production and the war effort. While Ukraine is employing an enormous portion of its state budget on the war, it has not sufficiently retooled its industry and society for war production to contend with its larger adversary.

Russia is outspending, outmanning, and outgunning Ukraine. This is a recipe for a stalemate in the medium term and a defeat, defined here as Russia retaining at least 20% of Ukraine’s territory, in the long term. Of course, there are scenarios in which Russia seizes the initiative and conducts more successful future combat operations against a severely depleted Ukrainian Armed Forces. For Russia, an optimal outcome would be bisecting Ukraine and maybe seizing the port of Odesa, creating a greatly diminished rump state. For now, however, the likelihood of that scenario remains remote.

Both Ukraine and its Western allies are to blame for these failings. In the U.S., the Biden Administration has been lethargic in its material support and largely ineffective in making the public case to support Ukraine, pushing for aid in fits and starts and infrequently. This has permitted the anti-Ukraine faction, its core being comprised of the Freedom Caucus and far-right media personalities like Tucker Carlson, Newsmax, and Fox News entertainers that cater to Trump’s proclivity for Russia and hostility towards Ukraine, to seize the narrative and obstruct Ukraine funding. The Biden Administration's absence on this issue has created a vacuum filled by far-right voices that increasingly influence the Republican base and incite the extreme elements of the party. There is also an emerging trend of Ukraine fatigue, exacerbated by the attention drawn to other crises, that is setting in as we approach the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine. Now, Ukraine, which has already received insufficient support, runs the real risk of being abandoned.

Tomorrow morning I will post the second part of this assessment.